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When examined for the period 1985-1992 as a whole, the impact of changes in the
targeted Fed funds rate on U.S. treasury bill rates has been weaker than during previous periods.
The period, however, should be viewed as three separate regimes.  First, I show significant
differences between the Greenspan and Volcker eras arising from management style.  Volcker
emitted ambiguous signals to the market, which induced "heterogenous" expectations.
Greenspan's market leadership forged more homogeneous expectations allowing treasury rate
responses prior to the target change to be attributed to market anticipations.  Further, I find
strong annual seasonality in borrowed reserves targets, corresponding to an agricultural cycle.
It suggests the Fed no longer "defends" a target for borrowed reserves and instead allows them
to follow the cycle.  Subsequently, the Fed funds rate adheres more closely to a target rate and
Treasury rates react similarly to an earlier direct Fed funds target regime.  Thus, I conclude that
as of late 1989, the Fed again directly targets the Fed funds rate.
Target rate changes induce starkly different reactions by treasury rates of various
maturities over the three regimes.  Applied to the term structure, I find that the average monthly
interest rates implied by the expectations theory is consistent with the pattern of actual treasury
rate reactions.  I compare implied monthly rate reactions after a policy shock between direct Fed
funds rate regimes of the latter Greenspan period and the 1975-1979 Fed.  I find that after a
policy easing, the market expects the monthly rate to remain at a lower level throughout a
horzion of at least 20 years.  This is consistent with expectations of a Fed that is able and
willing to contain inflation: although easing, the public has confidence it will not inflate over the
forseeable future.
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I. Introduction
Although the empirical support for the expectations theory is deeply contested (see Shiller (1990)
and Campbell (1995) for surveys), this leading theory of the term structure retains great intuitive appeal.  It is
the simple idea that long and short term interest rates should adjust until an investor interested in a relevant
time horizon is indifferent between investing in short term bonds rolled over and a long term bond.  Bond
traders, notably, believe it the rule responsible for the pattern of different maturity treasury securities
observed in market trading (Cook and Hahn, 1989).
Macroeconomists too are very interested in any mechanism relating short- and long-term rates.  The
short-term interest rate is agreed to be the most important instrument by which monetary policy actions affect
the economy.  Standard logic also maintains that real investment decisions of private firms are mainly
influenced by longer-term rates.  The term structure, the difference between long and short-term rates, is then
an interesting arena of study as long-term rates do not mechanically follow changes in short term rates. The
former, inter-alia, are believed to be strongly influenced by expectations of inflation.  It thus seems that the
term structure embodies information about the influence of monetary policy on the economy, but the exact
mechanism it represents is not yet clearly understood.
Mankiw and Miron (1986) provide a plausible reason for the lack of empirical support for the
expectations theory: the central bank fixes a certain level of a very short-term interest rate that is only as
predictable as the central bank wants it to be.  They provide evidence that the predictive power of
contemporaneous longer-term rates on future short-term rates disappears after the Fed was founded. 
Specifically, Mankiw and Miron argue that a term premium compensating investors for holding bonds outside
the investors' "preferred habitats", the maturities they prefer, fluctuates over time which biases downward the
estimated effect on the term structure by the short term rate.
Cook and Hahn (1989) examine the effect on the pattern of longer-term rates by a change in the
central bank influenced target Fed funds rate.  Cook and Hahn (C&H hereafter) find that a change in the Fed
target has an approximately equal impact on all daily money market rates but has a diminishing effect on
rates of instruments with longer maturities.  A Fed tightening then, on average, shifts up the yield curve       Trading in options on treasury instruments, for example, began in 1982. 
1
2
parallel for short-term rates, with a smaller increase for each longer maturity rate.  Since the short-term rates
are affected approximately equally by the Fed's policy move, C&H conclude that market participants expect
the Fed funds (overnight) rate, the basic rate on the yield curve and the Fed's primary policy tool, to remain at
the same level for approximately a year.   In the light of the findings of Mankiw and Miron, it means that the
term premium fluctuations predominate over this horizon, hiding evidence from standard tests of the
expectations theory.
The present study also examines the reaction of treasury securities' rates to changes in the targeted
Fed funds rate, but the setting is 1985-1992 which differs in important ways from the time studied by C&H. 
One difference concerns the degree of control the Fed desires to have on the Fed funds rate.  The late 1970's
was a time when the Fed manipulated reserves to hold the Fed funds rate to the targeted Fed funds rate with
great accuracy in seeking non-inflationary output growth.  1985-1992 was a much more complicated time,
but also more interesting.  First, the central bank instituted new operating procedures which include relaxed
control over the market Fed funds rate.   Market participants, thanks partially to lower transactions costs
enabled by financial derivatives , may more actively anticipate Fed moves than during the earlier study.  They
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are also likely to have had more confidence in the ability of their central bank to contain inflation.  Finally,
growing international integration has likely affected the Fed's influence on market rates.  One indication noted
by Rivera-Batiz, Rivera-Batiz (1993): foreign exchange trading in New York has grown from $5 billion per
day in 1977 to $50 billion a day in 1986 to $303 billion a day in 1992.  Taken together, these factors make
prediction of the Fed's impact on the pattern of market rates based on the results of the C&H study highly
uncertain.
I find compelling evidence that substantially different regimes were in effect during this time period. 
First, the reaction by treasury security rates during 1985 - 1987, a time corresponding to the tenure of
Chairman Volcker, but also within a highly unstable international environment, were significantly attenuated
compared to those during later periods.  Reports of market activity in the Wall Street Journal, WSJ hereafter,
suggest this was due to ambiguous signals emitted from the Federal Reserve.  Further, I find evidence that       Work by Bernanke and Mihov (1995) using econometric techniques to find that the Fed funds rate is an especially
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good indicator of monetary policy after 1988 supports this decision.  Goodfriend (1991) suggests the Fed switches at
will between borrowed reserves and direct Fed funds targeting.
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late in 1989 Chairman Greenspan dropped borrowed reserves targeting and resumed direct Fed funds
targeting. According to official Fed records, the Fed began changing borrowed reserves targets very
frequently, and they then exhibited a surprisingly substantial seasonal with annual frequency .  This is
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inconsistent with maintaining some desired level of borrowed reserves as was done earlier in the Greenspan
tenure.  The reaction in the term structure to the Fed's target rate changes during 1985-1992 thus depends not
only on who is the chairman, but also his choice of operating procedures.
The corollary is that one must pay close attention to the sub-periods for reliable analysis.  The whole
sample results of the the weaker impact of the Fed on Treasury security rates is explained by examining the
reactions across the regimes.  The weakest response occurs during the time presided by Volcker which I
attribute to either signalling, to expectations differences arising from differing activity within the periods or to
bias in the estimates due to the Fed using bond rates as indicator variable.  The latter Greenspan direct Fed
funds targeting regime reactions are comparable in size and fit to the C&H results corresponding to an earlier
direct Fed funds targeting regime.   With respect to the term structure, I find that the average monthly interest
rates implied by the expectations theory is consistent with the pattern of actual treasury rate reactions.  For
the borrowed reserves target regimes, I find the initially weaker reaction during the Volcker regime is offset
by a strong reaction by 5 year rates to bring monthly rates near to the pre-policy shock rate over the 5-7 year
horizon.  The reversion to the pre-policy shock rate comes within a 7-10 year horizon under the first
Greenspan regime.  I also compare implied monthly interest rate after a policy shock between direct Fed
funds rate regimes of the latter Greenspan regime and the 1975-1979 Fed.  I find that after a policy easing,
the market expects the monthly rate to remain at a lower level throughout a horzion of at least 20 years.  This
is consistent with expectations of a Fed that is able and willing to contain inflation: although it is easing, the
public puts a lower expected value on inflation over the forseeable future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  I first replicate the C&H study and find a weaker
reaction for the period as a whole.  Seeking to assign some cause for this lower influence of the Fed's direct4
influence on market rates, I examine whether procedural differences within the central bank may have been
responsible.  An indication of a major difference in Fed policy between the studies is a Fed funds rate subject
to much greater fluctuations.  For 1975-1979, Rudebusch (1994) measures a standard deviation of .28 for the
difference between the Fed funds rate and the target as opposed to .43 during 1985-1992).  In the more recent
period, the Fed states it regulates liquidity in the banking system by monitoring banks' borrowings at its
window for discount loans rather than targeting the Fed funds rate directly.  Goodfriend (1991) argues that
this procedure makes the Fed funds rate more susceptible to fluctuations in the demand for reserves and so
adds noise to the Fed's signals to the markets.  Another new procedure, contemporaneous reserve accounting,
is also frequently blamed for creating volatility in the Fed funds rate.  On the other hand, differences observed
in the reaction of market rates may be induced by events in the real economy, for example the stock market
crash, the financing of great budget deficits, and payments imbalances from chronic trade deficits.  In Part III,
I investigate the reaction of treasury security rates in three distinct regimes, incorporating controls for the new
operating procedures.  In Part IV, I examine in greater detail whether market participants react in anticipation
to the Fed or the Fed moves partly in response to the action in the Treasury markets.  Then in Part V, I
summarize the findings for implications to the expectations theory and conclude.
II. Are The New Operating Procedures to Blame? 
This study's ultimate goal is to measure the proximate impact of changes in the target Fed funds rate
on the rates of different-maturity Treasury securities and thus on the term structure of interest rates.  First, I
replicate as simply as possible the C&H results as a guide.  I measure, on dates the Fed reported changing the
target, the impact of these policy moves on treasury security rates of various maturities.  Following this I
examine in some detail the complications introduced by the Fed's current 'borrowed reserves' regime with
'contemporaneous reserve requirements' accounting.
II.A. Simple Replication of Cook and Hahn(1) )RTB&t ’ " % $@)RFF TAR
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In the earlier study, C&H examine the effect of perceived changes in the target Fed funds rate on
treasury instruments' rates.  C&H identify the perceived target changes using reports published in the "Credit
Markets" column of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ hereafter) and emphasize a close correspondence of this
measure to actual Fed target changes.  In the 1985-1992 period, the Fed funds rate was very volatile so that
market participants were often unable to perceive a change in the Fed's target Fed funds rate.  Indeed, many
target changes remained unnoticed by the WSJ reporters.  This prevented me from following the C&H
strategy, so I thus use official target changes as provided by the Federal Reserve Bank. 
According to the expectations theory,  the interest rates on long- and short-term treasury securities
are set by market forces so that a hypothetical investor having a certain  investment horizon will be indifferent
to purchasing a long-term instrument that corresponds to her horizon and rolling a short-term instrument
repeatedly over for the period.  Extending this logic to overnight rates, the investor with a horizon of three
months would consider rolling over overnight Fed funds for three months if she expected a return equal to
that on a three-month security.  Accordingly, a change in the Fed's targeted Fed funds rate, given a constant
term premium, results in a new configuration of treasury security rates that implies the market's average
expectation of the overnight rate for the next three months (and longer-term securities imply even further into
the future) and indicates how long the market expects the Fed to support the new Fed funds rate level. 
Assuming for the moment that the Fed funds rate target is exogenous (an issue I address in part IV), equation
(1) is the most direct measurement of the impact of a Fed funds rate target change on treasury market
securities' rates.  The first column of Table 1 gives results for the current sample period with C&H estimates
provided as reference in the last column.
Clearly the coefficients estimated using daily data from 1985-1992 are about one-half the size of
those estimated in the C&H study.  The accuracy of the estimates has also diminished.  Nevertheless, the
basic pattern of the coefficients' magnitudes is similar to that of the C&H study: relatively large and accurate
coefficients for the short-term rates decreasing in both dimensions as maturity increases.  This suggests that       One way that borrowed reserves may reflect real activity is if Fed monitors the characteristics of the banks
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borrowing from the window.  For example, Ho and Saunders (1985) model a Fed funds market in which risk-averse
small banks always lend while large banks always borrow.  If, counter to their usual behavior,  small banks suddenly
begin to request discount loans, the Fed may reasonably infer a serious negative reserve demand shock.  See also
empirical evidence by Allen, Peristiani, and Saunders (1989) and the discussion in Stigum (1990).
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Fed policy changes have had a weaker, but similar effect on the term structure as that found by C&H for
1975-1979.
One problem with this simple specification is that the coefficients are likely to be biased by the
effects of the changed operating procedures.  For example, changes in the targeted amount of borrowed
reserves may also be an important determinant of rates in the Treasury securities markets.  In the remainder
of part II, I discuss the effects of important new operating procedures on Treasury security rates' reactions to
policy shocks.  Later in part IV, I examine whether one reason the influence of the Fed may have changed is
that of greater anticipations by market participants.
II. B. Borrowed Reserves Targeting
In the standard description of the borrowed reserves operating regime (Goodfriend and Whelpley,
1986), the Fed supplies an insufficient amount of reserves via open market operations for the banking system
to meet its requirements.  On net, this induces an excess demand for reserves on the Fed funds market, where
those banks deficient in reserves borrow from others holding excess reserves, and some banks are then
compelled to obtain reserves by borrowing from the Fed's discount window.  Banks face a trade-off when
they consider discount loans.  The Fed strongly discourages banks from repeated borrowing, as described by
the famous phrase: "borrowing is a privelege and not a right".  On the other hand, banks have a pecuniary
advantage in discount borrowing as the Fed funds rate is often higher than the discount rate.  See Goldfeld
and Kane’s (1966) seminal work in modelling this relationship.
The idea behind "targeting" borrowed reserves is that the Fed wants to maintain that level of
borrowed reserves associated with a desired rate of economic activity .  And accordingly, the Fed will
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undertake open market operations to adjust non-borrowed reserves to reattain that desired or target level of
borrowed reserves if equilibrium had been upset by one shock or another.  One advantage of borrowed       This noise is also indicated by the high interest rates during this period.  The maximum closing quote of the Fed
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funds rate was 62.5% on December 26, 1990, a time when the market rates were much more modest.
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reserves targeting from the Fed's perspective is to spread out over time the impact of policy changes
(Goodfriend, 1991).  Yet it also permits the market Fed funds rate to drift further from the target than under a
direct Fed funds target regime.  If the Fed uses a direct target, policy makers can achieve very low dispersion
of the market rate around the target rate.
A simple first attempt to trace the effect of borrowed reserves targeting scheme on the impact of Fed
funds target changes on treasury security rates is to augment equation (1) with the independent variable
recording the official changes in the borrowed reserves targets.  This simple alteration of the model increases
the coefficients on the target Fed funds rates by about 15%, at least for the short-term securities.  The fit of
the regressions on short-term securities also improves.  I do not report the results in detail for the sake of
brevity.
II.C. Contemporaneous Reserves Accounting
Since February, 1984, the Fed requires banks to maintain a level of reserves for their deposit
liabilities over a concurrent biweekly period as contrasted to the previous system’s calculation over a past
weekly period.  The requirement is calculated by averaging the bank's daily amounts of "reservable accounts"
(mainly time and demand deposits) for a ten-day "computation" period ending on a Monday which is then
compared to the bank's average reserve holdings for a mostly-coincident ten-day "maintenance" period ending
on the following Wednesday, the settlement date.  Obviously, the description "contemporaneous" is
something of a misnomer since compliance to the requirement is not enforced until after the end of the
computation period.  As banks must now estimate both their accounts and reserves with but two days to
correct discrepancies, increased trading of Fed funds results, along with greater fluctuations in the market Fed
funds rate (the standard deviation of the closing Fed funds rate is 5.16% on settlement days, vs. 1.92%
otherwise ).  Under this system then, banks are more likely to find themselves with unintended reserves or
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may be forced to scramble for reserves due to unintended shortages.  Indeed, recent research, e.g. Balducci,       It is important to use the first Thursday since market rates are returning to their normal levels on this date from
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the either very high or very low rates of the final Wednesday.  The attenuation of signals to the market present the Fed
an additional policy instrument: for a subdued response to a Fed funds target change, the Fed can institute it on
settlement dates.   Interestingly, a large proportion of target changes occur on Thursdays.
        I do not include discount rate changes separately in the analyses since they were usually made in concert with
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Fed funds target changes (the four exceptions occurred very early in the sample).  Further, when included in the final
model, their coefficients differ insignificantly from zero.  
The influence of inflation expectations might bias the response of treasury rates.  I have run regressions
including the price of gold futures, a derivative aimed to avoid capital losses on nominal instruments, to reduce omitted
variable bias (although possibly introducing simultaneity bias).  Since they do not influence materially the coefficients
on Fed funds target changes, I do not report results.
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Bertola, and Foresi (1993) and Hamilton (1996), has shown the system to introduce biweekly seasonality in
the Fed funds rate.
Does this seasonality imposed on the Fed funds rate also have an impact on how changes in the Fed
funds target affects treasury security rates?  The signalling function of the Fed funds target rate could surely
be weakened if target changes occur on settlement days, when the banks' last-minute adjustments to the new
requirements are likely to interfere with the rate's signal to market participants.  To measure this influence, I
construct a dummy variable taking the value of one if a Fed policy change occurs on either the last
Wednesday or the first Thursday of the reserve period .  When interacted with the Fed funds target change,
5
the coefficients are highly significant, not only for the impact on Fed funds rates, but also for the treasury
securities rates (see the second column of Table 1).  I do not interpret the coefficients on the interacted term
as any reaction of market rates to Fed policy change, but simply as a control for the settlement dates' noise.  I
therefore interpret the coefficient on the un-interacted independent variable as the treasury rate response on
days other than the settlement dates.  The preferred model will include both the variables controlling for
contemporaneous reserves accounting and borrowed reserves targeting, to be described in the next part.
II. D. Responses for Entire 1985-1992 Period
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Controlling for settlement dates' effects and borrowed reserves target changes as motivated above,
regressions of changes in various maturity treasury security rates on Fed funds target changes imply a similar,
albeit weaker impact on the term structure as found by C&H (see results in second column of Table 1).
Table 1 (second column) shows that short-term treasury securities' rates react in a signifiicantly
negative way to a change in borrowed reserve targets.  The standard model of the Fed funds market,
Goodfriend and Whelpley (1986) cannot easily explain negative $  coefficients since it predicts the joint 2
determination of the Fed funds rate and the amount of borrowed reserves (given a discount rate).  From a
different perspective, however, it is sensible that an increase in borrowed reserves will increase the liquidity
of the banking sector and thus decrease treasury security rates.  Furthermore, given the data at my disposal
(see figure 1), it does seem that the Fed determined borrowed reserves targets follow for most of the 1985-
1992 period the actual amount of borrowed reserves.
Any event study must fulfill two conditions to measure an accurate reaction by e.g. treasury security
rates to Fed funds rate target changes.  First, a change in the Fed funds target rate must be accurately
signalled to treasury market participants.  Obviously, if noise or other interference prevents market
participants from perceiving a target change, little of any response should be attributed to an expectations
story.  In this case, the only response by treasury security rates might be due to banks' treasury security sales
motivated by a need to obtain reserves after e.g. a tightening.  The second condition for an accurate measure
is that the change in impulse, here the Fed funds rate target, must not be widely expected  by market
participants.  Otherwise, market participants' anticipatory transactions are likely to bring the reaction before
the impulse.  On several occasions during this period, WSJ reported Fed signals of an imminent policy move
prior to the official target change date.  Discount rate changes, for example, sometimes preceded the
corresponding Fed funds rate target change.  Obviously in these cases, measuring the response on the target
change date will ignore the part of the reaction prior to the official change.       For support, I regressed the change in the Tbill rates on the target change and borrowed reserves target change
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for those episodes not reported in the WSJ and found near zero coefficients with a below zero adjusted R .
2
       Surprisingly, "ideal" target changes were evenly distributed over the three regimes, 8 during Volcker, 5 during
8
Greenspan I and 8 during Greenspan II; the latter had the best proportion of target changes that were ideal, at 40%.
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For these reasons, one can question whether the results shown in the first two columns of Table 1 are
free from bias due to the changes not being perceived by market participants.  To test this, I assign a dummy
variable the value one for those changes that were recognized and reported in the WSJ on the day subsequent
to the target change.  This should be an accurate measure of recognizance by the market: the WSJ reporters
certainly had an interest in reporting changes in the targeted funds rate: they often discussed expected policy
moves .   I further assign another dummy variable to one if it was universally expected by market
7
participants.  I followed the same conservative selection criterion as explained in greater detail in section IV
below.  Table 4 reports results from regressing various maturity treasury market secuities on Fed funds target
changes when the two conditions are fulfilled.  Unfortunately, only 21 observations remain out of 77, yet
comparing Table 1's second column with Table 4 shows that the reaction by a treasury security's rates to an
average Fed funds target change differs little from an "ideal" target change.  The greatest difference is seen in
the reaction by 10 and 30 year securities which differ by .03 from the ideal .  This should reassure that the
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response on the same day as the target change does not differ substantially due to measurement error.  Further
analysis will be done in part IV to measure treasury securities reactions both before and after the target
change date.
III. The Three Regimes of 1985-1992
The story as presented so far, however, is deceptive.  Based on logic described below, I analyze the time
period between 1985 and 1992 as consisting of three distinct sub-periods in which the Fed's policy impulse
yielded substantially different reaction by treasury market securities' rates.
III.A. Borrowed Reserves and Fed Funds Targeting       One conjecture for the abandonment of borrowed reserves targeting is that the Fed wanted an instrument that
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provided stronger signals to the market.  Goodfriend (1991) gives as one of the advantages of borrowed reserves
targeting that the Fed can avoid “news-making” policy, spreading the market reaction over several days.  Perhaps the
Fed changed to Fed funds targeting with the option of changing the target on settlement dates if it wants a "non-news-
making" reaction (due to the high volatility of the Fed funds rate on these dates).
       As can be seen from figure 1, the Fed funds - discount rate differential was historically very high during 1989
10
when the borrowed reserves target was running against the fitted seasonal.
       Coefficients were significantly negative for the months of October and November for the whole sample and
11
positive for May during the Greenspan period.
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The borrowed reserve target scheme remains in use officially and has been taken seriously by several
researchers, e.g. Leeper (1995) pg. 9, Roberds, et.al (1996), Strongin (1995).  Yet I find convincing evidence
that the Fed has in fact abandoned borrowed reserves targeting to return to a direct Fed funds rate targeting
regime .  For one, the average time between borrowed reserve "target" changes has decreased from 80
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business days during Volcker's regime to 14 during the latter period of Greenspan's regime.  Figure 1,
plotting daily average borrowed reserves targets and the Fed funds target to discount differential over 1985-
1992, shows that starting in late 1989, the Fed repeatedly changes borrowed reserves targets without
corresponding changes in the differential.  These frequent changes in borrowed reserves targets are more
plausible if borrowed reserves were being used as indicator to support a Fed funds target rate.  Figure 1
shows that the underlying pattern in borrowed reserves especially after 1989 is heavily influenced by a huge
seasonal with annual frequency (the figure includes as orientation the fitted value of borrowed reserves
resulting from a regression in daily levels of the borrowed reserves target on linear and quadratic trends with
monthly dummies).  The fitted policy relationship rises in the spring and summer and falls steeply in the fall
and winter with exceptions in 1986 and early in 1989, when the Fed likely did maintain a borrowed reserves
target .  The tight coincidence of the two lines argues strongly against a spurious relation.  Support is also
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given by significant seasonal coefficients  in a regression in differences of borrowed reserve targets on the
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changes in the Fed funds to discount differential (and one lag) as well as the monthly dummies (Table 2). 
Further, autocorrelations (Figure 2) show the market Fed funds rate has adhered more closely to the target
during the latter Greenspan regime.  The market, as represented by the WSJ, certainly noted a difference:
reports mentioned fully 18 of the 20 target changes the following day during the latter Greenspan regime, a12
much greater proportion than the 16 of 28 in the Volcker period or the 12 of 29 during the Greenspan
borrowed reserves target period.  I continue the analysis suggested by these results in part III.D below.
III.B. The Fed and the Governors
Another explanation for the different market rate reactions during the C&H and present studies is
suggested by the WSJ "Credit Markets" column which reported distinctive management styles by Greenspan
and Volcker.  It is surprising that a difference can arise in the impact of monetary policy since the chairmen
share a strong dislike for inflation.  As reported in the WSJ, market participants were unclear about the
direction of policy during Volcker's time.  One remark not atypical of others, cited near the end of Volcker's
tenure: "There is a malaise in the market ... a sense that no one is in control and that the markets are being
pushed and pulled by every development." (WSJ, April 24, 1987).  Monetarists accused the Fed of trying to
obfuscate its actions.  Friedman (1985), for example, thought that the Fed undertook excessive open market
operations to hide their net effect and thus avoid responsibility.  Finally, Volcker's comments before the
Senate Banking Committee were often so obtuse that the press reported lengthy detailed debate on the precise
interpretation of his words (WSJ, various issues).  One example of the resulting volatility is that, according to
Federal Reserve records, the Fed increased its targeted rate by 12 1/2 basis points on January 24th, 1985. 
Fed "watchers" quoted in the WSJ debated this point for over two weeks, a far cry from 1975-1979, when
C&H describe analysts as almost always able to identify target changes on the same day.  In stark contrast,
Greenspan obviously cares about guiding the market, e.g. on Jan. 23, 1991, WSJ reported the Fed would ease so
long as money growth did not accelerate.  Since money supply figures are a focal point and published weekly, it
gave credit markets a clear indication of the Fed's intentions.
Volcker's tactics may have been an clever adaptation to economic conditions.  Volcker's
contradictory goals mainly involved the long slide from highest yen/dollar exchange rate (260 yen per dollar)
to the level agreed at the Louvre (the February, 1987 policy agreement preceded Greenspan's swearing-in on
August 11, 1987).  Many WSJ reports during this time made clear the Fed's dilemma between high interest
rates to defend the dollar and low rates to avoid a recession.       I do not evaluate the effectiveness of the Fed chairman.  First, as noted above, one cannot separate the chairman
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from the period in which he governed.  Further, I have not yet discussed the dynamic impacts of policy, i.e. Volcker
may have moved market rates prior to the target date.  Finally, even if the market's reaction over several days is also
weaker during Volcker's regime, it is inappropriate to use influence over market rates as a sufficient statistic for the
chairman's effectiveness.
       The surprisingly weaker response of the market Fed funds rate under Greenspan I vs. Volcker is explained in part
13
IV below: under Greenspan I, practically the entire response occurs on the two days prior to the official target change.
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In a very simple first attempt to ascertain the influence of the chairman on the impact of Fed policy, I
construct a dummy variable taking the value of one during Greenspan's time as chairman.   I interact this
variable with the change in the targeted Fed funds rate to use in a regression including the change in borrowed
reserves target as above.  Nearly all explanatory power during 1985-1992 arises during Greenspan's
chairmanship .  A more detailed set of results will be presented and discussed below.  
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III.C. Treasury Market Responses of the Three Regimes
The final "same-day" specification of the model includes variables as motivated in parts III.A and
III.B above.  Based on this analysis, I divide 1985 - 1992 into three regimes.  The Volcker period is a
turbulent time when markets were divided in their expectation of the direction of the economy.  Greenspan
became chairman and continued a borrowed reserves target policy, but markets were reassured either through
his leadership style or by the new international cooperation.  Finally, Greenspan switched in a later period to
direct Fed funds targeting, without commitment to defend some desired level of borrowed reserves.  I fix the
date of the second regime shift at October 19, 1989, after which borrowed reserves targets began to trace very
closely the annual seasonal component (see figure 1).  Although not based on statistical methods, this choice
is logical and Chow tests are consistent with the regime shifts as shown in Table 3 (see also the third to fifth
columns of Table 1).
There are stark differences between the regimes in the reaction of treasury market security rates.  The
smallest impact during the Volcker regime, a larger impact under the Greenspan I regime and finally, the
strongest under the Greenspan II regime.  This is not surprising.  If markets did not receive strong signals
from Volcker's Fed, any treasury rate reaction would be muted .  Finally, the reaction in the Greenspan II
13       In the study C&H probe two days before and after the event and find that treasury security rates do not change
14
significantly prior to the event, although some short-term rates change after the event.  Dale (1993) finds the Bank of
England's policy moves induce large rate changes after the target change date.
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regime is similar to that reaction measured by C&H, further support that the Fed again pursues a direct Fed
funds target. I continue the analysis using the total sample and also provide estimates separately for the
Volcker, Greenspan-I and Greenspan-II regimes.  For reasons to be described in part IV.D below, I consider
the Greenspan II results to be reliable estimates of the impact of a policy change on the term structure. 
Estimates for Volcker and Greenspan I regimes will be reported in part IV.C below.
IV. Anticipation and Recognition
As discussed above, an anticipated target change may escape measurement since much of the impulse
on the market may occur before the "event".  After all, bond traders have high pecuniary incentives to
anticipate Fed actions.  A clever trader who infers an imminent Fed move to ease the Fed funds rate can, for
example, purchase treasury bills to sell them later at a higher price once the Fed has implemented the lower
rate.  Event studies may also ignore reactions in the market if the price does not immediately attain an
equilibrium level on the target change date.  This recognition effect suggested by Goodfriend (1991) is
especially likely during borrowed reserves target regimes since the Fed funds rate is not as clear a signal as
during direct Fed funds target regimes .   Event studies are also sensitive to the issue of exogeneity of the
14
independent variable.  Later, I examine whether the changes in observed market rates are due to market
participants' anticipations or the Fed reacting to changes in treasury rates.  It may also be the case that both
the Fed and markets follow a third impulse (e.g. indications of the state of the real economy).
There are also problems using estimations over several days to measure the impact.  First, how
should the start date of the multiple date target change episode be determined?  In  theory, it should begin
when the market begins to anticipate, obviously an unobservable variable.  As discussed in more detail below,
I find no systematic significant relationships of treasury rates and the target change prior to four days before       In a previous draft, I defined episodes to begin 5 days prior to the target change.  The significant relationships
15
between long-term rates 5 days before the target change and the target changes, however, have since been found to be
entirely due to reactions on 3 settlement dates in each of the three regimes.  This casts considerable doubt on a robust
relationsip between target changes and market rates in the 5 day horizon.
15
the target change, so I define the "event" to have a duration of 9 days, 4 days prior to and 4 days after the
target change .
15
To isolate changes in market rates that arise due to anticipations of a Fed move, I define a qualitative
variable that indicates days on which the WSJ reported market participants had formed a consensus on a
projected Fed funds target change.  This is important since whether the Fed is exogenous or not is
contentious.  Some researchers, for example Dale (1990), suggest the central bank may be influenced by
market rates prior to a policy change.  This is an argument that the Fed is endogenous to make suspect any
inferences about the Fed's influence on market rates.  Alternatively, Goodfriend (1991) suggests the Fed
moves are exogenous since the Fed funds target is adjusted at irregular intervals only after sufficient
information has been accumulated.  The profit motive induces traders to react quickly to any news suggesting
a possibly new market direction.   The Fed, on the other hand, can insulate itself from the daily fluctuations to
instead maintain a reputation for reliability.  It constructs a model of the economy that evolves from a
rigorous process to culminate in a decisive policy move.  Understanding this, market participants thus gain
information about the state of the economy in the timing and amount of a change in the Fed funds target.  A
study by Cook and Korn (1993) finds a significant reaction in interest rates to the change in employment
announced in the monthly U.S. Labor Department report.  As they argue, this is consistent with the market
trying to mimic the Fed's decision process to move before the Fed does.
A final problem in using estimations over several days is that once the market anticipates that the
Fed is to change its targeted Fed funds rate, the changes engendered in the term structure induce other
reactions in the economy.  This final problem may be considered as serious as time aggregation of weekly or
monthly data.  Given the market's volatile reaction to news, the average 9 day episode may be interpreted as
the time required for the market to converge to a new configuration of rates following the target change.
In the remainder of part IV, I report measurements of changes in treasury security rates several days
prior and subsequent to changes in the targeted Fed funds rate.  After describing the rationale for using a 9-(3) )RTB&t%i ’ " % $1)RFF TAR
t % $2BR TAR
t%i % ut%i s.t.i ’&4,...,0,...,4
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day episode, I report results that show significant anticipatory and recognition effects.  I then examine
whether it is plausible that the market anticipates the Fed or if the Fed uses some interest rate as a gauge of
the economic conditions.
IV.A.  Reaction of Treasury Securities' Rates in the Nine-Day Episode
I first summarize the reaction of treasury securities rates, and thus the term structure, to changes in
Fed funds rate targets during the entire 1985-1992 period.  These results should be considered preliminary
due to the evidence that different regimes were operative.  Later, I report efforts to control for the most
important remaining influences on rates. 
Results of the cumulative regressions using the whole sample of 44 observations (third sub-column
of each maturity in Table 5) confirm at least crudely the basic pattern found by C&H:  short term rates react
most strongly with a diminishing reaction by longer-term rates.  In detail, however, there are interesting
differences.  The strongest reaction is by 3 and 6 month securities while the 1 and 3 year maturities react less
(although the 3 year securities react strongly relative to the time studied by Cook and Hahn).
Interesting patterns are observed prior to the target changes (see Table 5).  Significant reactions are
measured in long-term rates on days T - 4 and T - 1 (in fact, the long-term bond reactions are stronger before
the target date).  Short-term rates' reactions prior to the target change date are more evenly distributed, e.g.
the 6 month T-bill reacts significantly on each day prior to the target change.  Further, the 3 year bond rate is
apparently reacting similarly to both long- and short-term rates.  On the day of the target change, the 3-year
rate rises as much as short-term rates, yet longer-term rates do not react at all.  On day T - 3 too, the 3-year
bond reaction was closer to that of shorter-term rates than to longer-term rates.  More insight into these
anomalies can be gained by separating the sample into regimes discussed in part III.  This will be done in part
IV.C below.  First, however, I address whether the Fed reacts to market rates to imply that anticipations are
not responsible for the significant relationships in treasury security rates prior to the target change.(4) )RTB&t%i ’ " % $1@)RFF TAR
t % $2()RFF TAR
t(Fed.Antic.t%i) % ut%i s.t.i ’&4,&3,&2,&1
       The effects on treasury markets of speculators seeking to exploit expected Fed changes are well-known.  One
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analyst illustrates clearly: "The market clearly is expecting a discount rate cut. If it doesn't happen, you can expect
short-term rates to bounce back up.  The market is already priced for a discount rate cut." (WSJ, May 17, 1985)
       Cook and Hahn (1988) use a similar strategy to classify discount rate announcements as either leading or
17
following the market during 1973-1985.
17
IV. B. Incorporating the Market's Anticipation of Fed Action
To measure market participants' anticipations of Fed policy, I use a qualitative criterion to select
those episodes that were generally anticipated .  I carefully read the "Credit Markets" column in the WSJ to
16
distinguish whether there existed a clear unanimous belief among analysts of an imminent change in Fed
policy .  I emphasize that according to this algorithm, a day during an episode is anticipated only if there was
17
reported to exist a consensus among market participants.  Under other circumstances, lucky or skillful
analysts anticipate the Fed, but since the beliefs are not widely shared, bond prices and hence interest rates
are less likely to be influenced.  The variable may be considered a lower bound, however, since there certainly
were times when speculation of a Fed target change affected bond prices and yet the view of the market was
not unanimous.  In practice, classifying the market's Fed anticipations on individual days prior to the target
changes is not subject to much ambiguity once it is decided to base the decision on a consensus view of a
change in Fed policy.  It is indicated by a phrase such as "most analysts believe..." and is confirmed by a
thorough search through the article for any dissenting opinions.  I follow this procedure for each day before a
target change in each of the 44 episodes.  The consensus criterion permits in most cases a clear judgement,
although again it tends to be conservative.  See appendix 1 for details about the decision regarding each
episode.
I make regressions of equation (4) for each day prior to the target change.  Included on the right-hand
side is an interaction of the target change and the qualitative variable (given a value of one if the day of the
episode is anticipated).  A significantly positive $  with $ = 0 would support the exogeneity of Fed policy.  2    1 
Table 6 shows that on average, market participants significantly anticipate the Fed's policy move only two(5) )RTB&t%i ’ " % $1@)RFF TAR
t % $2()RFF TAR
t(GreenIt%i) % ut%i s.t.i ’&4,&3,&2,&1
       During Greenspan II, the interaction term and target change are subject to high multicollinearity, (e.g. the
18
correlation of the Fed funds target change and the interaction term was over .90 on day T - 1).  Based on this
strong relationship, I attribute to anticipations the treasury rates' responses on days before the target change.
       Separate regressions on day T - 4 observations during the Greenspan I regime gave target change yielded
19
very poor fit indeed, all adjusted R  were less than zero.
2
18
days before the actual target change.  Several significant $  coefficients on days T - 3 and T - 4 raise doubts 1
about the Fed's exogeneity.  Further insight will be given below.
IV.C.  Borrowed Reserves:  Volcker or Greenspan?
The questions posed by the whole sample results in Table 6 beg for explanation.  I thus examine the
sample differentiating the Volcker and Greenspan I borrowed reserves regimes using interaction terms.  I seek
to find which regime or both is responsible for the day T - 4 reaction that was not, according to table 6,
caused by anticipations.  I am unable to include with confidence the Greenspan II observations in this analysis
since with elimination of episodes brought only two values of the Fed funds target changes (easings of 25 and
50 basis points) .
18
The results show (see Table 7) that the day T - 4 reaction by long-term rates occurred only during the
Volcker regime .  In fact, the first rate reactions prior to the target date during Greenspan I occurred on day T
19
- 2, the same day there were significant anticipations as shown in Table 6.  This may suggest to some that the
Volcker Fed used long-term interest rates as indicator of real activity regularly 4 days prior to the actual
target date.  It is also consistent, however,  with the market moving by anticipations: perhaps the qualitative
variable I construct is simply too conservative.  More credence for this argument is gained when we recall that
Volcker did not encourage (an understatement) the market to form homogeneous expectations about the Fed's
likely tactics.  Accordingly, analysts anticipated the Fed moves, but there was no consensus in the market and
















IV.D. Implications for the Expectations Theory
I find that borrowed reserves target changes bring such weak same-day treasury responses that they
implausibly represent the entire change in treasury security rates to Fed policy changes.  I thus interpret the
cumulative nine-day response (table 7) as the impact on the term structure during these regimes.  This is
consistent with Goodfriend's (1991) characterization of this regime as spreading out a policy move’s impact
over several days.  On the other hand, I use the same-day responses (table 1) to measure the impact on the
term structure during the direct Fed funds rate target regime (Greenspan II).  I justify this choice on several
grounds.  First, the market recognized (as reported in WSJ) the response in 18 of the 20 episodes.  Second,
the Fed funds rate reaction was very strong (Table 1).  And finally, the reactions are comparable in magnitude
to those found by C&H during the 1975-1979 direct Fed funds target regime (Table 1).
I compare borrowed reserves regimes (Volcker and Greenspan I) and the direct Fed funds rate
regimes (Greenspan II to 1975-1979) to gain intuition of the implications of the results to the expectations
theory.  I thus construct an average monthly implied interest rate suggested by the constant term premium
version of the expectations theory.  Roughly, the lowest maturity reaction suggests an average monthly rate
over its horizon.  The next higher maturity reaction encompasses the earlier average, thus implying a monthly
average for the horizon between the last month covered by the shorter reaction and the last month of its own
horizon.  Since the gap between maturities is up to twenty years (in the case of the longest maturity tested),
the average gives a more intuitive view than by simply looking at the reaction itself.
An example should clarify this procedure.  The Greenspan II reaction of the 3 month and 6 month
treasury securities were .46 and .49 respectively.  First I assume that the monthly average rate over months
t+0, t+1, and t+2 is .46.  Using the estimated 6 month reaction and the expectations theory gives us the
average monthly rates for months t+3, t+4, and t+5.  That is,)RTB 6






t%i] / )RTB 1
3,4,5
       Implied average monthly rate changes shown in figures 3 and 4 include reaction by 5 and 7 year securities not
20
presented in tables 1 and 7 for space reasons.  Point estimates for Volcker: .56 and .38; Greenspan I: .70 and .62;
Greenspan II: .37 and .31 for the 5 and 7 year maturities, respectively.
       For simplicity, I assume the Fed policy move occurs to a flat term structure.
21
20
(where the overlined variables represent the implied average monthly rate over the horizon given in
subscript).  The average monthly of longer horizons are then constructed using the reaction of each
succeeding longer term treasury securities reaction from table 1 (Greenspan II direct) and table 7 (Volcker
and Greenspan I borrowed reserves schemes) .  This is the method used to construct figures 3 and 4.
20
A comparison of borrowed reserves regimes on graph 4 shows that as a result of 1% tightening , the
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two regimes differ most noticeably below the 36 month and over the five-year horizons.  The public expected
nominal interest rates to increase more under Greenspan I for the horizon to three years out.  Later, however,
it seems that the public expected Volcker's Fed to be more able to return short run rates to the pre-policy
level.  The average level over the above-10-year horizon during Greenspan I was approximately three times
higher than during Volcker.
I compare direct Fed funds target change under Greenspan II to the time studied by C&H.  This is
interesting because, prior to the great Volcker switch to non-borrowed reserves targeting in 1979, the market
had little confidence in the central bank's ability to restrain inflation.  I will compare easings in this
circumstance since Greenspan II policy moves were only of this type.  In this case, however, a conservative
central banker such as Greenspan would be understood not to be prone to ease excessively and we can thus
hypothesize that the market would expect inflation not to be excited by a central bank under such a chairman. 
In this case, inflation expectations over the long run would be lower than in the earlier direct Fed funds rate
regime.  And thus the reaction in long run rates should be greater.  According to figure 4, this is exactly what21
I find.  Starting at the 12 month horizon, short-term rates are expected to be lower under Greenspan II than
during the time studied by C&H.  Despite the similarity in average monthly rates implied by the short-term
reactions, there is a consistent and large gap between the Feds over the longer horizon.
V. Conclusion
First, I find a large amount of seasonality in borrowed reserves targets at an annual frequency, which
corresponds to an agricultural cycle, rising in the spring and declining in the autumn.  This leads to suspect
that the Fed no longer "defends" a target for borrowed reserves, but follows the demand for reserves
incorporated in this seasonal cycle.  This is a partial basis for concluding that the Fed has actually, if not
officially, abandoned borrowed reserves targeting and now uses a direct Fed funds rate to aim for non-
inflationary growth.  The conclusion is supported by a closer adhesion of the Fed funds rate to the target and
larger same-day responses to target changes (similar indeed in size to a previous direct Fed funds target
regime).  That the Fed again uses direct Fed funds targeting is likely a reason that the Fed funds rate is again
an excellent indicator of Fed policy, as found by Bernanke and Mihov (1995).
Paying close attention to the sub-periods shows that the weaker market reaction to the Fed using the
whole sample is explained by differences in each regimes.  The weakest response occurs during the time
presided by Volcker which I attribute to either signalling (Volcker's style was to emit no clear signals to the
market so expectations were "heterogenous" while Greenspan's market leadership forged more
"homogeneous" expectations), to expectations differences arising from differing activity within the periods or
to bias in the estimates due to the Fed using bond rates as indicator variable.  The latter Greenspan direct Fed
funds targeting regime reactions are comparable in size and fit to the C&H results corresponding to an earlier
direct Fed funds targeting regime.   With respect to the term structure, I find that the average monthly interest
rates implied by the expectations theory is consistent with the pattern of actual treasury rate reactions.  For
the borrowed reserves target regimes, I find the initially weaker reaction during the Volcker regime is offset
by a strong reaction by 5 year rates to bring monthly rates near to the pre-policy shock rate over the 5-7 year
horizon.  The reversion to the pre-policy shock rate comes within a 7-10 year horizon under the first22
Greenspan regime.  I also compare implied monthly interest rate after a policy shock between direct Fed
funds rate regimes of the latter Greenspan regime and the 1975-1979 Fed.  I find that after a policy easing,
the market expects the monthly rate to remain at a lower level throughout a horzion of at least 20 years.  This
is consistent with expectations of a Fed that is able and willing to contain inflation: although it is easing, the
public puts a lower expected value on inflation over the forseeable future.23
Appendix 1: Anticipations of Fed Target Changes in Specific Episodes
This appendix gives examples of language in the "Credit Markets" column of the WSJ to illustrate the logic for
categorizing whether each date within the 44 episodes (1985 - 1992) was subject to a unanimous expectation of
a target change.  Dates reported in the WSJ are those appearing in print the day following the day given in the
second column.  Since I use the WSJ to uncover whether the market was anticipating the Fed or the Fed was
responding to the long-term interest rates, I omit days subsequent to the target change; i.e. the target change date
is the final date listed in the 2nd column of the table.
Epi- Date Fed Ant Wall Street Journal 
sode Move Fed "Credit Markets" description of episode
1 Jan.17 - 24, Tight 0 Government reports indicated lower inflation.  On Jan. 18: "Fed will stick to easy
1985 money policy for the next few weeks".  On Jan. 23 (the day before the target
change) "investors are beginning to believe inflation will stay at low levels". 
2 July 5 - 11, Ease 0 On July 10, day before target change, "Concern about dollar may prevent Fed from
1985 easing" But there was pressure to ease (Kemp telegram to Fed requesting discount
rate cut).
3 July 19 - 25, Tight 0 On July 23, reporter noted "market is wandering aimlessly".
1985
4 Dec. 12 - 18,  Ease 0 This is a difficult one to call.  On Dec. 13, "pressures are mounting for the Fed to
1985 ease ... many analysts say...". On Dec. 16 (Monday), Kaufman was reported to
predict lower rates; the market acted on his comments, with rates going lower. 
Opinions were noted to differ, however.  On Dec. 17, "many say the Fed appears to
have adopted an easier credit policy..." But later in the same article, "many analysts
argue that the [FOMC] probably voted to maintain the easier credit conditions of
recent weeks".  I assign the value of 1 to anticipated Fed move only on Dec. 17. 
5 Mar. 3 - 7, Ease 1 The market did not widely expect the Fed to move until March 6.  On March 4, for
1986 example, "pressure on Fed intense to cut rate if Germany and Japan cut."  was
followed by "... but others disagree".  The Mar. 6 headline was "Bond prices rise
on wide expectations of cut in discount rate". 
6 May 16 - 22, Tight 0 The concern apparent in the WSJ was on likely inflation from oil price increases. 
1986 On May 19, was reported "oil price increase cuts optimism about inflation and
strengthens argument that Fed won't ease". However, oil prices eased and "dollar
played an increasingly influential role".
7 May 30 - Tight 0 On June 3, Treasury secretary Baker announced that there was "room for further
Jun. 5, 1986 decline in rates", but this did not result in a widely expected Fed move.
8 Jul. 7 - 11, Ease 1 On July 8, "speculation that Fed will lower discount rate has swept through market
1986 for weeks leading many investment managers to contend that bond prices already
reflect such a move".  The discount rate change was announced a day before it
became effective.
9 Nov. 28 - Tight 0 The Fed's tightening move was clearly unanticipated since the headline on Dec. 3
Dec. 4, 1986 was "Bond Prices rise as belief grows Fed will ease in coming months"Epi- Date Fed Ant Wall Street Journal 
sode Move Fed "Credit Markets" description of episode
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10 Apr. 24 -30, Tight 1 Expectations of a policy move grew from Apr. 24 when "some analysts say the Fed
1987 will react soon ..." to Apr. 27 (the next Monday): "... a growing number of analysts. 
They say the Fed has tightened its credit hold slightly ..." On the next day,
"Speculation that the Fed has tightened has been widespread for weeks now."   I
assigned Fed expectation to 1 starting on the 28th.
11 May 15 - 21, Tight 0 Inflation was feared throughout this episode.  For example, May 19: "...concern
1987 about inflation was responsible for the big sell-off in financial futures...". No great
concern about a Fed move.
12 Jun. 26 - Jul Ease 0 WSJ characterized this episode as "lackluster" with little activity by market
2, 1987 participants.
13 Sep. 18 - 24, Tight 0 On Sept 21, Greenspan stated that there was little evidence of inflation.  Little
1987 about expectations of a Fed move was reported during this episode.
14 Jan. 22 - 28, Ease 0 A clear example of unanticipated Fed policy: headline for Jan. 26, the day before
1988 the Fed eased:  "Bond [prices] decline as durable goods report indicates Fed easing
is unlikely soon".
15 Feb. 5 - 11, Ease 1 Anticipation of Fed move illustrated by headline for date of Feb. 9: "Short Term
1988 rates fall as speculation grows that the Fed is easing slightly".  Also "... the market
smells Fed ease."
16 Mar. 14 - 30, Tight 0 Fed move unanticipated: on Mar. 28 "most agree that a credit-tightening move isn't
1988 likely any time soon".
17 May 3 - 9, Tight 1 On May 6, "Almost every analyst believes that rates are going up". 
1988
18 May 19 -25, Tight 0 Inflation, central during this episode (May 19: "commodity prices dominated the
1988 credit markets", although May 23 lower prices were noted), led to "growing
speculation that the Fed may tighten", but had not become unanimous by the time
of the Fed policy move.
19 June 16 - 22, Tight 1 June 16 headline: "Bonds sag as inflation fear flares up...".  This culminated in the
1988 headline of June 20 "...allowing new rise in Fed Funds rate to curb inflation". 
20 July 13 - 19, Tight 0 Greenspan quoted as saying Fed would "err on the side of restrictiveness", but no
1988 clear indication of anticipation of the Fed's policy move.
21 Oct. 14 - 20, Tight 0 WSJ did not note any widespread anticipation of policy move by Fed.
1988
22 Dec. 9 - 15, Tight 1 For Dec. 9, the headline indicated that the market already believed that the Fed was
1988 tightening: "Fed seems to have tightened policy slightly..." (this is 4 days before the
actual policy change).
23 Apr. 28 - Tight 0 Inflation was problem leading up to the Fed change, but abated with lower oil
May 4, 1989 prices and more favorable government reports.  On May 3 it was reported that the
"beige book" released by Fed indicated that "inflationary pressures may be easing"
and this increased the likelihood of Fed keeping the target steady.Epi- Date Fed Ant Wall Street Journal 
sode Move Fed "Credit Markets" description of episode
25
24 May 31 - Ease 1 Opinions on whether the Fed would ease or not were divided until the release of the
June 6, 1989 employment report on June 2 which resulted in the headline "Fed likely to reduce
rates soon"
25 June 30 - Ease 1 On June 30, "bond prices surged again as speculation grew that the Fed will cut
July 7, 1989 short term interest rates soon."  On July 6, an analyst was quoted "We had 3
questions last week: whether the Fed would ease, when and by how much.  We've
got 2 out of 3.  How much ... will sort itself out by Monday or Tuesday." (this
appeared in the WSJ the day the Fed eased).
26 July 21 - 27, Ease 1 On July 21: "many economists are warning their customers not to expect the Fed to
1989 ease any further until August... - if then".  But on July 25 "speculation that the Fed
is allowing interest rates to move lower gained momentum yesterday when the Fed
failed to enter the market during its normal pre-noon intervention period." [it had
not drained reserves, as predicted].  The next day's headline was "Bond Prices
Mark Time as Further signs emerge the Fed is easing".
27 Aug. 4 - 10, Ease 0 Anticipations in this episode were set by an unexpectedly strong employment report
1989 and "speculation that the Fed had paused in its march toward lower interest rates". 
This appeared for Aug. 4.  News in the remainder of the episode centered on the
treasury's bond sales.
28 Oct. 12 - 18, Ease 1 Anticipations were aroused early this episode.  On Oct. 12, the headline: "Treasury
1989 Bonds rise modestly on speculation that Fed is letting rates ease slightly". 
Problems in the junk bond and stock markets influenced trading in the bond
markets.
29 Oct. 31 - Ease 0 Oct. 31: A sharper than expected fall in sales of single-family homes aroused the
Nov. 6, 1989 anticipation of the market to the hope that the Fed would cut rates. This was not
universal, however, and the market was described as waiting for the results of the
difficult-to-predict employment report.
30 Dec. 14 - 20, Ease 0 Junk bonds were in trouble, but the Fed did not act to ease credit conditions at the
1989 convenience of the traders.  Dec. 18: "Many are sniping at the Fed for failing to cut
rates". And: "Although there are widespread expectations that the Fed will
eventually ease credit conditions further, uncertainty about the timing of the move
is keeping many investors out of the market." 
31 July 9 - 13, Ease 0 There was little anticipation by market participants during this episode until July
1990 12 (the day before the target change) when Greenspan "surprised the bond market
... to ease credit conditions".
32 Oct. 23 - 29, Ease 0 There was some anticipation of a Fed move on Oct. 25, not widespread.  Then on
1990 Oct. 26, a budget  agreement in congress put pressure on the Fed to cut since they
had indicated they would if this were to happen. 
33 Nov. 7 - 14, Ease 1 On Nov. 13, speculation about the Fed "supported short-term Treasury securities".
1990 "Many investors expect the Fed to ease as early as today".
34 Jan. 3 - 9, Ease 0 On Jan. 7 & 8, mid-east war fears raised oil prices to stoke inflation fears. On Jan
1991 8, the market recognized a Fed easing (a day before the target change)
35 Jan. 28 - Feb Ease 0 A low-volume episode when market participants were waiting for results from the
1, 1991 employment report and news from the war in Kuwait.Epi- Date Fed Ant Wall Street Journal 
sode Move Fed "Credit Markets" description of episode
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36 Mar. 4 -8, Ease 0 Market participants were unsure whether the end to the war in Kuwait would bring
1991 an end to the recession.
37 Apr. 24 - 30, Ease 1 On Apr. 24, institutional investors were reported buying in anticipation of Fed
1991 action.  Pres. Bush pressured for lower rates, reported for Apr. 25. On Apr. 26
"The Fed will probably cut both the discount rate and Fed funds rate this spring,
many analysts say".
38 Jul. 31 - Aug. Ease 0 On Aug. 2, "economy now looks increasingly wobbly, that inflation pressures will
6, 1991 subside and that the Fed probably cut interest rates later this month or early
September". A bond rally on Aug. 6 was attributed to the "surprise" target change
by the Fed shows that the majority of market participants were unwilling to commit
themselves.
39 Sept 9 - 13, Ease 1 On Sept. 11, traders were nervous about the inflation implications from an
1991 expected labor department report.  The Sept. 12 headline, "...amid signs Fed will
act soon to push interest rates lower.", was based on remarks by a Fed official.
40 Dec. 2 - 6, Ease 0 An unexpected episode.  On Dec. 4 (day before the target change) it was reported
1991 that participants expected that "pressure on the Fed to cut rates is likely to surge if
tomorrow's employment report indicates economic decay..."
41 Dec. 16 - 20, Ease 1 On Dec. 16, prior to planned new bonds sales, "It's widely expected in the markets
1991 that the FOMC will authorize another ...cut in the Fed funds rate."
42 Apr. 3 - 9, Ease 1 On Apr 6, there was a "...small possibility the Fed may ease...".  Then on Apr. 7,
1992 the headline "Bond prices move higher as expectations grow that Fed will cut rates
soon to spur economy".  There followed a discussion about whether the Fed had
already eased (it hadn't).  However, the next day, it was noted "Economists don't
believe ..a sign that the Fed is easing".
43 June 26 - Ease 1 A heavily anticipated episode.  Many economic indicators signalled a slowing
July 2, 1992 economy which analysts believed would campel the Fed to ease credit conditions. 
On June 29, headline "Bill rates at auction decline to 20 year lows as sentiment
grows that Fed will ease credit". and June 30 headline "...speculation continues
over likelihood of Fed rate cut".
44 Aug. 31 - Ease 0 This was an episode which had very light activity reported since bond market
Sept 4, 1992 participants were waiting for results from the employment report.
The dummy variable, anticipation of Fed target change, is assigned the value of 1 if the Wall Street Journal
indicated the market was unanimously expecting the Fed to move.  Although each individual day has its own value
for the variable in the data, the third column in the above table summarizes each episode.  So, for example, when
only one day of the episode was affected by inflation, the column is marked 0, but for that day the dummy variable
is assigned the value of 1.27
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Same-Day Reaction of Treasury Security Rates
To Fed Funds Target Change
Dep. Ind. Simple All Volcker  Green I  Green II Cook &
(141 obs)  (141 obs) (37 obs)   (34 obs)   (70 obs) Hahn
DW: .03 2.11 .21 1.88 .31  1.90 -.06 1.82 .32 1.81
)RFF )RFF .40 .72*   .72*   0.32  1.39*
TAR
(1.76) ( 3.31) ( 3.99)  ( 1.52) ( 2.71)
)BR .0004   .0011   .0005   .0006 
TAR
( .80) ( .66) ( .81) ( .69)
F.Thur.IA -2.02* -2.52** -.86 -3.80*
(-3.63) (-2.35) (-1.73) (-3.11)
DW: .25 1.80 .32 1.98 .14 2.24 .28 2.15 .59 2.09 .47 1.89
)3mo )RFF .23* .29*    .13   .30*  .46* .55*
TAR
(4.15) ( 4.91) ( 1.45) ( 3.40) ( 7.74) (8.10)
)BR -.0003**   -.0007  -.0002  -.0002
TAR
(-2.42) (-1.66) (-1.45) (-1.61)
F.Thur.IA -.23**   -.33**  -.11  -.18
(-1.91) (-2.31) (-.76) (-.77)
DW: .27 1.92 .35 2.06 .06 2.04 .27 2.51 .63 2.12 .59 1.82
)6mo )RFF .24* .31*  .13 .32*  .49* .54*
TAR
(4.57) ( 5.42) ( 1.55) ( 3.51) ( 9.12) (10.25)
)BR -.0002**   -.0004  -.0002  -.0002
TAR
(-2.21) (-1.01) (-1.66) (-1.31)
F.Thur.IA -.29* -.30**  -.25  -.23
(-2.87) (-2.10) (-1.87) (-1.82)
DW: .24 2.04 .30 2.11 .11 2.22 .22 1.96 .55 2.21 .56 1.94
)12mo )RFF .23* .27*   .15  .13**  .48* .50*
TAR
(4.58)  ( 5.20) ( 1.69) ( 2.50) ( 7.81) (9.61)
)BR -.0001 -.0003 -.0001 -.0001
TAR
(-1.59) (-.75) (-1.19) (-.76)
F.Thur.IA -.22** -.41*  .11 -.33*
(-2.16) (-2.98) ( 1.13) (-2.79)
DW: .15 2.17 .17 2.20 .06 2.07 .23 1.87 .32 2.35 .46 1.59
)3yr )RFF .19* .23* .19** .13* .40* .29*
TAR
(4.21)  ( 5.01) ( 1.93) ( 2.96) ( 5.80) (7.87)
)BR -.0001 -.0001 -.0002** .0001
TAR
(-1.37) (-.24) (-2.78) ( .75)
F.Thur.IA -.19 -.46** .17 -.51*
(-1.69) (-2.25) ( 1.49) (-3.19)
DW: .04 2.03 .05 2.04 .00 2.01 .08 1.57 .20 2.22 .32 1.94
)10yr )RFF .09** .13** .09 .09** .26* .13*
TAR
(2.11) ( 2.67) ( .82) ( 2.15) ( 4.35) (5.85)
)BR -.0001  -.0001 -.0001** .0001
TAR
(-1.24) (-.15) (-2.18)  ( .85)
F.Thur.IA -.14  -.40**  .13 -.46*
(-1.46) (-2.19) ( 1.30) (-3.30)
DW: .02 2.02 .02 2.04 -.03  2.05 .06 1.66 .16 2.09 .29 2.04
)30yr )RFF .06 .09**   .03 .09** .21* .10*
TAR
(1.58) ( 2.07) ( .35) ( 1.95) ( 4.15) (5.46)
)BR -.0001   .0000  -.0001**  .0000
TAR
(-1.31) (-.01) (-2.03) ( .25)
F.Thur.IA -.10 -.30**  .11 -.40*
(-1.17) (-1.92) ( 1.13) (-3.10)
Constants were included in the estimations, but were economically small and significant only in two cases (the 30
bond rate during Greenspan I and the Fed funds rate for the entire sample).  I also allowed for changes in First
Thursday intercepts which were only significant for the long-term bonds in the Greenspan II regime.  The t-
statistics in parentheses are calculated using errors corrected for heteroskedacity according to White or Huber.¯ R
2 DW
Table 2
Incentive for Borrowed Reserve and Seasonals
Dep: Sample Volcker Green I  Green II
)BR 1983  648  534  801
TAR
 0.16   2.18  0.08  2.13  0.28    2.07  0.22    2.06
)(RFF -dis)  114.11*  51.27  255.24*  116.32*
TAR
t
( 4.98) ( 1.86) (5.13) (6.48)
)(RFF -dis)  2.24  17.69  0.75  9.63
TAR
t-1
( 1.31) ( 1.60) ( 0.93) ( 0.57)
mo2  0.33  -0.16  -0.36  1.16
( 0.30) (-0.13) (-0.20) ( 1.55)
mo3  -0.19  0.91  -4.40  1.15
(-0.13) ( 0.98) (-0.97) ( 1.30)
mo4  1.29  2.36  -0.73  1.87
( 1.47) ( 1.56) (-0.73) ( 1.75)
mo5  2.58  -0.36  2.89  4.11**
( 1.77) (-0.17) ( 1.04) ( 2.08)
mo6  1.24  -0.03  -1.92  4.58**
( 1.28) (-0.11) (-1.41) ( 2.42)
mo7  1.59  0.12  3.64  2.22
( 1.37) ( 0.20) ( 0.87) ( 1.64)
mo8  0.61  1.75  -1.45  1.04
( 0.56) ( 1.32) (-0.59) ( 1.10)
mo9  0.28  2.33  -0.24  -1.52
( 0.31) ( 1.32) (-0.15) (-1.33)
mo10  -3.01**  0.66  -1.73  -5.73*
(-2.80) ( 1.94) (-0.85) (-2.98)
mo11  -4.68**  -0.71  -7.77  -5.07*
(-2.75) (-0.51) (-1.22) (-3.13)
mo12  -1.84  -1.55  -3.25  -1.95
(-1.67) (-0.78) (-1.26) (-1.68)
All regressions included constants which were insignificantly different from 0 and also linear and
quadratic trend terms which were significant only at the time of Volcker.  *, ** denote significance
at 1% and 5% levels respectively.¯ R
2
Table 3
Chow Tests of Treasury Security Response to Fed Funds Target Changes
During Volcker, Greenspan I and Greenspan II Regimes
)RFF )3 mo )6 mo )12 mo )3 yr )10 yr )30 yr




)RFF .72** .13** .13** .15** .19**   .09 .03
TAR
( 2.42) ( 2.14) ( 2.14) ( 2.39) (2.61) ( 1.30) ( 0.52)
)BR .001 -.0007** -.0004 -.0003 -.0001 -.0001 - 0
TAR
( 0.83) (-2.34) (-1.35) (-0.90) (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.01)
F.Thur.IA -2.52* -.33* -.30** -.41* -.46* -.40* -.30**





)RFF -.40 .17 .19 -.01 -.06 -.00 .05
TAR
(-0.78) ( 1.65) ( 1.74) (-0.13) (-0.47) (-0.00) ( 0.49)
)BR -.0007 .0005 .0002 .0002 -.0001 -.0001   -.0001   
TAR
(-0.43) ( 1.56) ( 0.72) ( 0.55) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.39)
F.Thur.IA 1.66 .22 .05 .52** .63* .53** .41**






)RFF .67 .33* .36* .34* .21** .17 .18**
TAR
( 1.55) ( 3.75) ( 3.90) ( 3.73) (1.92) ( 1.74) ( 1.94)
)BR -.0005 .0004 .0002 .0001 .0003   .0002 0
TAR
(-0.33) ( 1.24) ( 0.58) ( 0.36) (0.61) ( 0.51) ( 0.11)
F.Thur.IA -1.28 .16 .07 .08 -.05 -.06 -.10
(-1.21) ( 0.73) ( 0.30) ( 0.36) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.47)
Chow:pr >F .16 0 .01 0 .07 .06 .09
The model also included constants, and allowed for changing intercepts in each regression.  They were in all




Responses of Treasury Security Rates to "Ideal" Target Changes
 21 obs    )RFF  )RTB3  )RTB6  )RTB12 )RTB3y  )RTB10y )RTB30y
    0.48  0.60  0.67  0.53 0.44  0.29 0.31
DW:     1.91  1.79  1.27  1.40 1.85  1.86 1.92
)RFF 1.286 ** 0.277*  0.278* 0.228* 0.208*  0.099** 0.116*
TAR
( 2.28) ( 7.34) ( 7.09) ( 5.68) ( 4.36) ( 2.05) ( 2.74)
)BR  0.0018  -0.0019* -0.0016* -0.0012* -0.0011* -0.0013* -0.0011*
TAR
( 0.94) (-6.93) (-6.26) (-5.06) (-4.57) (-5.05) (-4.85)
F.thurs  0.324** 0.088**  0.098* 0.105* 0.076* 0.062** 0.049**
( 2.19) ( 2.47) ( 3.78) ( 3.42) ( 2.73) ( 2.58) ( 2.30)
F.thurs.IA -3.589* 0.1862  0.204  0.157 0.339**  0.403*  0.343*
(-5.06) ( 0.92) ( 1.36) ( 0.95) ( 2.42) ( 3.20) ( 3.05)
cons -0.07  -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* -0.06* -0.04**  -0.03*
(-1.08) (-4.90) (-5.49) (-5.53) (-4.07) (-2.59) (-2.73)
All regressions are reported with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity according to Huber/White.
t-statistics are reported below coefficient estimates in parentheses. *, ** represent significance at the .01

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring Anticipations of a Fed Policy "Shock" 
Treasury Security Rates
T - 4
Variable RFF 3 mo. 6mo. 12mo. 3 yr. 10 yr 30 yr
.00 .00 .05 .05 .07 .05 .10
) RFF -.04 .08 .11** .09 .15** .11 .12**
TAR
(-.24) (1.41) (1.97) (1.51) (2.11) (1.88) (2.42)
Fed. Antic. -.15 -.10 -.03 .09 .00 .01 -.00
(-.42) (-.78) (-.20) (.68) (.02) (.08) (-.03)
T - 3
.13 .05 .11 .06 .04 .00 .00
) RFF .40* .08 .12** .09** .10 .08 .03
TAR
(2.91) (1.78) (2.68) (2.07) (1.76) (1.25) (.69)
Fed. Antic. -.30 -.01 -.10 -.03 -.01 -.00 -.02
(-1.31) (-.07) (-1.28) (-.44) (-.15) (-.05) (-.28)
T - 2
.03 .19 .14 .00 .00 .00 .00
) RFF .31 .02 .03 .02 -.02 -.03 -.03
TAR
(1.78) (.41) (.51) (.42) (-.34) (-.43) (-.54)
Fed. Antic. -.37 .16** .14 .03 .06 .04 .01
(-1.53) (2.26) (1.86) (.43) (.59) (.47) (.08)
T - 1
.06 .12 .12 .16 .23 .19 .18
) RFF -.44 -.04 .01 -.04 .06 .04 .04
TAR
(-1.65) (-.66) (.12) (-.69) (.97) (.76) (.89)
Fed. Antic. .69** .16** .12 .16** .10 .10 .08
(2.16) (2.17) (1.62) (2.47) (1.48) (1.44) (1.29)
t-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  *, ** indicate significance at the 1% and
5% levels, respectively.Table 7
Borrowed Reserves Targets And Fed Chairmen
Cumulative Impact over 9 day Episodes
28 obs RFF 3 mo.  6 mo. 12 mo. 3 yr 10 yr 30 yr
Rb2/DW -.01   2.45 .25    1.74 .06    1.56 -.02   1.84 .03    1.83 .01  1.80 .14  1.63
T - 4 ) RFF -.07 .28* .24* .17** .24** .19** .23*
TAR
(-.69) ( 2.93) ( 3.05) ( 2.65) ( 2.67) ( 2.34) ( 4.30)
Green IA -.10 -.46* -.23** -.09 -.15 -.09 -.17
(-.26) (-3.97) (-2.08) (-.86) (-1.19) (-.85) (-1.88)
Rb2 DW: -.06  2.09 .23    2.35 .15    1.88 .02    1.98 .08    1.85 -.01   1.65 .05    1.54
T - 3 ) RFF .30** .34* .35** .21 .30 .11 .18
TAR
( 2.11) ( 3.05) ( 2.31)  ( 1.69) ( 1.61) ( .76) ( 1.91)
Green IA -.24 -.43** -.28 -.05 -.03 .11 -.02
(-.65) (-2.87) (-1.53) (-.30) (-.13) ( .55) (-.15)
Rb2 DW: .04  1.79 .26    2.09 .40   1.98 .19    1.87 .16    1.70 .00    1.90 -.05   1.76
T - 2 ) RFF .39** .34* .38* .15 .21 .03 .11
TAR
( 2.21)  ( 3.46) ( 3.14) ( 1.59) ( 1.75) ( .25) ( 1.02)
Green IA .13  -.05 .09 .26 .22 .26 .04
( .37) (-.29) ( .53) ( 1.56) ( 1.22) ( 1.51) ( .29)
Rb2 DW: .09    1.67 .34    2.03 .48    1.73 .29    1.72 .28    1.56 .09    1.58 .07    1.49
T - 1 ) RFF .61** .37*  .45* .22 .36** .16 .20
TAR
( 2.22) ( 3.24) ( 3.01) ( 1.75) ( 2.14) ( 1.12) ( 1.75)
Green IA .18 .12 .21 .35 .26 .27 .09
( .41) ( .62) ( 1.03) ( 1.76) ( 1.14) ( 1.42) ( .60)
Rb2 DW: .14    1.99 .46    2.10 .40    2.13 .34    1.92 .27    1.80 .03    1.66 .04    1.66
T ) RFF 1.36* .54* .46** .32** .36 -.03 -.08
TAR
 ( 2.91) ( 3.49) ( 2.17) ( 1.97) ( 1.45) (-.15) (-.47)
Green IA -.35 .08 .23 .36 .31 .38 .31
(-.63) ( .39) ( .95) ( 1.66) ( 1.11) ( 1.55) ( 1.60)
Rb2 DW: .28    2.18 .38    2.25 .33    2.02 .28    1.82 .33    1.83 .16   1.77 .16    1.77
T + 1 ) RFF 1.02** .52* .50** .38** .52** .21 .12
TAR
( 2.59) ( 3.25) ( 2.02) ( 2.15) ( 1.94) ( .90) ( .62)
Green IA .15 .05 .24 .26 .22 .23 .21
 ( .27) ( .24) ( .87) ( 1.00) ( .69) ( .88) ( 1.01)
Rb2 DW: .30    2.04 .45    2.09 .33    2.03 .31    1.81 .35    1.62 .18    1.75 .13    1.96
T + 2 ) RFF .91* .63* .60** .46** .66** .41 .26
TAR
( 5.31) ( 3.45) ( 2.54) ( 2.76) ( 2.75) ( 1.82) ( 1.24)
Green IA .25 .03 .19 .25 .15 .04 .09
( .64) ( .15) ( .69) ( .94) ( .47) ( .16) ( .39)
Rb2 DW: .17    2.07 .50    2.43 .28    2.36 .32    2.01 .35    1.83 .17    2.00 .09    2.19
T + 3 ) RFF .44 .65* .62** .47**   63**  35 .20
TAR
 ( 1.74) ( 4.05) ( 2.45) ( 2.68) ( 2.84) ( 1.40) ( .82)
Green IA .41 .11 .23 .36 .31 .20 .24
( 1.03) ( .50) ( .76) ( 1.25) ( 1.00) ( .72) ( .86)
Rb2 DW: .29    2.19 .58    2.45 .21    2.67 .34    2.11 .36    2.00 .11    2.11 .03    2.28
T + 4 ) RFF .72* .62* .48** .44** .63* .34 .17
TAR
( 5.25) ( 3.94) ( 2.16) ( 2.63) ( 3.13) ( 1.57) ( .72)
Green IA .65 .13 .18 .35 .23 .11 .16
( 1.74) ( .63) ( .69) ( 1.34) ( .84) ( .46) ( .58)
These regressions included cumulative borrowing targets, constants and allowed for different borrowing target
constants under both regimes.  *, ** represent 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively.  